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ENCRYPTION SAFE HARBOURS AND DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 
Mark Burdon a, Jason Reid a and Rouhshi Low
ABSTRACT 
 a 
Data breach notification laws require organizations to notify affected persons or 
regulatory authorities when an unauthorized acquisition of personal data occurs. Most 
laws provide a safe harbour to this obligation if acquired data has been encrypted. There 
are three types of safe harbour: an exemption; a rebuttable presumption and factor-based 
analysis. We demonstrate, using three condition-based scenarios, that the broad 
formulation of most encryption safe harbours is based on the flawed assumption that 
encryption is the silver bullet for personal information protection. We then contend that 
reliance upon an encryption safe harbour should be dependent upon a rigorous and 
competent risk-based review that is required on a case-by-case basis. Finally, we 
recommend the use of both an encryption safe harbour and a notification trigger as our 
preferred choice for a data breach notification regulatory framework.  
a
Keywords: Data breach notification; encryption; information security management; data 
protection. 
 Queensland University of Technology, Australia. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The conceptual justification for mandatory data breach notification laws is relatively 
straightforward. An organisation that has suffered a data breach that exposes personal 
information must notify those persons whose information may have been acquired so they 
can take action to mitigate potential harms, predominantly arising from the threat of identity 
theft. A general safe harbour to notification exists in most data breach notification laws that 
relates to encryption.1 Put simply, an organisation that has suffered a data breach involving 
encrypted personal information does not have to notify those persons who may have been 
affected by the breach. The rationale for the safe harbour is twofold. First, to reduce the risks 
of notification fatigue2
                                                     
1 It should also be noted that other common and broad safe harbours exist particularly in relation to 
‘good faith’ use by employees and to acquired information that is already in the public domain. 
 and the regulatory compliance burden on organisations and 
regulators, by requiring notification only in circumstances where there is an appreciable risk 
2 Notification fatigue refers to the negative impact of over-notification upon individuals and 
potentially the overall impact of data breach notification laws. See e.g. A Cavoukian, A Discussion 
Paper on Privacy Externalities, Security Breach Notification and the Role of Independent Oversight (2009) 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacy_externalities.pdf> at 19 March 2010, 9 and P M 




of identity fraud.3 Second, to encourage both private and public sector organisations to 
adopt encryption technologies for the collection and storage of personal information thus 
strengthening their information security management practices.4 Data breach notification 
laws have been successful at revealing serious and innumerable instances of ineffective 
management regarding the security of personal information, but these apparently simple 
laws have produced outcomes that are conceptually complex, from regulatory, market 
oriented and legal perspectives.5 Encryption safe harbours are a case in point. 
Three types of encryption safe harbour have been identified.6 They are: exemptions; 
rebuttable presumptions and factor-based analysis. However, whilst the issue of different 
notification triggers has been dealt with extensively in the data breach notification 
literature,7 encryption safe harbours have not.8
                                                     
3 See e.g. California Office of Privacy Protection, 'Recommended Practices on Notice of Security 
Breach Involving Personal Information' (California Office of Privacy Protection, 2008). 
 This is surprising because both safe harbours 
and notification triggers play integral roles in the operation of data breach notification laws. 
Triggers indicate the situations where notification is required. A higher or lower trigger 
4 See e.g. L Rode, 'Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the Responsibility on 
the True Victim Increase Data Security?' (2007) 43(5) Houston Law Review 1597:1628; M E Jones, 'Data 
Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A Journal of Law and 
Policy for the Information Society 555, 573; K E Picanso, 'Protecting Information Security Under a 
Uniform Data Breach Notification Law' (2006) 75(1) Fordham Law Review 355, 384. 
5 See e.g. F H Cate, Information Security Breaches: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead (2008) 
<http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/Information_Security_Breache
s_Cate.pdf> at 19 March 2010; F J Garcia, 'Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay 
between State and Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time' (2007) 17(3) Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 693; P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data 
Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) Michigan Law Review 913; B St. Amant, 'Misplaced Role of Identity 
Theft in Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches' (2007) 44 Harvard Journal on Legislation 505. 
6 M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555. 
7 See generally P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) 
Michigan Law Review 913; B St. Amant, 'Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in Triggering Public Notice of 
Database Breaches' (2007) 44 Harvard Journal on Legislation 505; S a Needles, 'The Data Game: Learning 
to Love the State-Based Approach to Data Breach Notification Law' (2009) 88 North Carolina Law 
Review 267; T J Smedinghoff, The State of Information Security Law: A Focus on the Key Legal Trends (2009)  
S Lee, 'Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding Now Apply to 
Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs' (2006) 1(1) Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 125; K E Picanso, 
'Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification Law' (2006) 75(1) Fordham 
Law Review 355; L Rode, 'Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the 
Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?' (2007) 43(5) Houston Law Review 1597. 
8 Those articles that have covered the issue in most depth are M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent 
Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 555 T H Skinner, 'California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First 
State Breach Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation' 
(2003) 10(1) Richmond Journal of Law & Technology ; J Winn, 'Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification 
Laws Possible?' (2009)  Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2009 . 
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point will have a significant impact on the types, and thus numbers, of data breaches to be 
notified. Encryption safe harbours operate to exclude a range of breach scenarios from 
notification. The operation of triggers and safe harbours are therefore important because 
they define the compliance requirements for data breach notification.  
We conduct a critique of the three types of encryption safe harbours using a scenario-based 
analysis. The scenarios assume the satisfaction of a necessary precondition for the adoption 
of an encryption safe harbour, namely, that personal information acquired without 
authorisation exists in encrypted form. We distinguish three categories of encryption use 
based on their decreasing relative effectiveness in protecting personal information, namely 
that the encryption and associated information security management practices : (1) are likely 
to be effective (2) might be effective or (3) are likely to be ineffective as they can be bypassed. 
We then demonstrate that an effective safe harbour is dependent on the performance of a 
rigorous risk-based review that is required on a case-by-case basis each time a breach 
incident is suspected. Finally, we conclude by recommending our preferred encryption safe 
harbour, namely, factor-based analysis in conjunction with our preferred choice of 
notification trigger, a two-tier notification trigger. This type of notification trigger has two 
forms of notification requirement. The first relies on a broad acquisition-based trigger that 
requires notification by a breached entity to relevant regulatory authorities where there has 
been or is believed to have been an unauthorised acquisition of personal data. The second is 
based on a narrower risk-based trigger that requires notification by the breached entity to 
individuals where a reasonable risk of harm exists. The use of a two-tier trigger therefore 
attempts to ensure that regulators are notified of all data breaches promptly and individuals 
are notified only if a risk-based assessment identifies a risk. 
2  ENCRYPTION, CRYPTOGRAPHY AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
Before we embark on our critique of encryption safe harbours, we provide an overview of 
encryption and the related field of cryptography as a foundation for examining how these 
concepts have been applied in data breach notification laws and legislative proposals.  
Mao defines encryption as “a process to transform a piece of information into an 
incomprehensible form... The input to the transformation is called plaintext and the output is 
called ciphertext. The reverse process of turning ciphertext into plaintext is called 
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decryption.”9 Together, the encryption and decryption transformations are known as 
cryptographic algorithms or ciphers. They are controlled by a cryptographic key or keys, which 
are typically long random numbers.10  A cipher is said to be breakable (and therefore 
insecure) if the plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext without knowledge of the 
decryption key within a specified period of time.11 It is a fundamental principle of 
cryptography that the encryption and decryption algorithms may be publicly known 
without weakening the security of the cipher, which rests solely in the secrecy of the 
decryption key.12 There are two related reasons for this: firstly, if a supposedly secret 
algorithm becomes known, the entire system must be replaced with a new cipher. This is 
considerably less convenient than simply changing a key. Secondly, experience has 
repeatedly shown that keeping an algorithm secret over any reasonable length of time is 
extremely difficult.13  
                                                     
9 W Mao, Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice (2004), 24. 
The apparent benefit of cryptography is that it substitutes the problem of protecting the 
secrecy of a potentially large amount of plaintext, for the problem of protecting the secrecy a 
much smaller key. Based on the critical assumption that the decryption key is only available 
to people authorised to access the plaintext, the ciphertext requires no further protection and 
can transmitted over insecure communication channels such as the Internet or stored on 
electronic devices that are routinely lost or stolen such as laptop computers and USB drives. 
Since knowledge of a ciphertext and the corresponding decryption key is equivalent to 
knowledge of the plaintext, the controlled distribution of keys is the principal challenge in 
using cryptography. In practice it has proven to be very difficult. Indeed, successful attacks 
10 Symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as DES and AES use the same key for encryption and 
decryption. Asymmetric algorithms such as RSA use a different key for encryption and decryption.   
11 See A J Menezes, P C Van Oorschot and S a Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press 
series on discrete mathematics and its applications. (1997), 14. All ciphers can be broken given 
sufficient time and computational resources by systematically trying all possible keys. If the number 
of possible keys is sufficiently large, a so called exhaustive search of the key space is infeasible because 
it exceeds the minimum specified time for which the cipher must remain secure. The goal of cipher 
design is therefore to ensure that the fastest way to break the algorithm is exhaustive search.  
12 A system that relies on the secrecy of an algorithm for its security violates Kerckhoff's principle 
which states that no inconvenience should occur if the system falls into the hands of an adversary, 
because all security should reside in the secrecy of the keys. See A Kerckhoffs, 'La Cryptographie 
Militaire' (1883)  Journal des Sciences Militaires 5. 
13 Secret algorithms such as COMP128 and A5 used in the early days of GSM mobile telephony were 
subsequently reverse engineered, and significant weaknesses were identified. They are now 
considered broken. See E Barkan, E Biham and N Keller, 'Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of 
GSM Encrypted Communication' (2008) 21(3) Journal of Cryptology 392.  
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on key management systems and procedures are far more common than those that exploit 
weaknesses in the cryptographic algorithms themselves.14  
One of the reasons why key management is hard is that cryptographic keys for secure 
algorithms are too long for humans to remember so they must be recorded somewhere.15 
However, for convenience of access the decryption key must be available on demand, but 
only to those authorised to see the plaintext. This is actually a problem of authentication and 
access control.16 Ensuring selective and controlled access to the decryption key presents a 
vexing problem. Take for example a laptop computer that stores a file containing encrypted 
personal information. The authorised user should be able to easily access the information so 
the decryption key will need to be available to the laptop to recover the plaintext. However, 
an attacker that gains access to the laptop should not be able to decrypt the file. A 
fundamental but common key management mistake is to store the decryption key on the 
same device as the ciphertext with inadequate protection. In the worst case, the decryption 
key may simply be stored in another file on the laptop. This offers very little additional 
protection compared to not encrypting the data at all.17 A more common approach is to 
encrypt the decryption key itself under a different memorable key known as a passphrase or 
password. Thus, encryption and passwords are often used together. Unfortunately, in 
practice, the security of their combination does not exceed the security offered by the 
password: if it is easy to guess, the fact that the personal information is encrypted using a 
secure algorithm with a random key of adequate length is immaterial.18
                                                     
14 See R J Anderson, 'Why Cryptosystems Fail' (1994) 37(11) Communications of the ACM 32. 
 Experience has 
shown that without very specific guidance and enforced selection constraints, people choose 
15 For example, a common key length used with the widely accepted AES algorithm is 128 bits (bits 
are zeros and ones). When encoded as a decimal number, a 128 bit key requires up to 39 digits.  
16 See e.g. R J Anderson, 'Why Cryptosystems Fail' (1994) 37(11) Communications of the ACM 32. 
Passwords are the most widely used authentication mechanism but they have significant and well 
documented shortcomings.  
17 Access to the laptop’s filesystem is controlled at first instance by password authentication enforced 
by the operating system at log on. However, this can be easily bypassed by removing the laptop’s 
hard disk and accessing it using another operating system. Removal is not necessary if the laptop is 
configured to boot from the optical drive or USB port. 
18 See e.g. Narayanan, A. and Shmatikov, V. Fast Dictionary Attacks on Passwords Using Time-Space 
Tradeoff. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security CCS ‘05, 
Alexandria, VA, USA, November 07 - 11, 2005, 364-372. The authors report a password guessing 




passwords that are easy for password guessing programs to guess.19 Passwords are also 
increasingly susceptible to key-logging malware and so-called phishing attacks.20 
The best approach for protecting decryption keys is to store them on a dedicated key 
management device, separate to the device that stores the ciphertext. Financial institutions, 
the pioneers of the civilian use of cryptography, stored cryptographic keys in hardware-
based security modules, mainly to ensure that programmers and system developers could 
not access them.21 As cryptography came to be more widely used by business and 
government organisations, particularly by end-users, smart cards were promoted as a secure 
place to store cryptographic keys. However, they have proved to be expensive to deploy and 
maintain and have not been widely adopted. Notwithstanding the cost and inconvenience, 
separate storage of cryptographic keys on dedicated hardware devices represents best 
practice.22 
The fallibility of encryption as a protection measure for personal information is an important 
practical consideration given the proliferation of data breach notification laws throughout 
the world.23 Both qualitative24 and quantitative evidence suggests that the effect of 
encryption safe harbours has been an increased uptake of encryption technologies. The 
Ponemon Institute in 2009 surveyed 997 US-based managers and executives with 
information technology responsibilities. The survey found that 67% of respondents stated 
that their organisation primarily used encryption technologies to mitigate against data 
breaches.25 This figure was a small decrease from the 71% of respondents who were asked 
the same question in 2008 and an increase from the 66% who replied in 2007.26
                                                     
19 See J Yan, A Blackwell and R Anderson, 'Password Memorability and Security: Empirical Results' 
(2004) 2(5) IEEE Security & Privacy 25.  
 Furthermore, 
20 See A Emigh, 'The Crimeware Landscape: Malware, Phishing, Identity Theft and Beyond' (2006) 
1(3) Journal of Digital Forensic Practice 245 for an overview of malware tools and attack methods. 
21 R J Anderson, 'Why Cryptosystems Fail' (1994) 37(11) Communications of the ACM 32. 
22 See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Publication SP 800-57 Part 1, Recommendation for 
Key Management - Part 1: General (Revised) (2007) <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf> at 20 March 2010. 
23 A Maurushat, Data Breach Notification Law Across the World from California to Australia (2009) 
<http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps09/art11/> at 20 March 2010. 
24 Samuelson Law Technology & Public Policy Clinic, Security Breach Notification Laws: Views from Chief 
Security Officers (2007) <http://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu/samuelsonclinic/files/cso_study.pdf> at 
21 March 2010, 17. 
25 Ponemon Institute, 'US Enterprise Encryption Trends' (2009), 11. 
26 Ibid.  
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64% of respondents stated that they had adopted encryption to comply with privacy or data 
security regulations, which represented an increase from 58% in 2008 and 51% in 2007.27
The contention that data breach notification laws have increased the uptake of encryption 
technologies is supported by the same Ponemon survey conducted in Australia in 2009. 
Only 33% of 482 respondents stated that encryption was used to mitigate data breaches 
whereas 15% indicated that encryption was used to comply with privacy or data security 
regulations. 57% of respondents stated encryption was used to ensure that privacy 
commitments were honoured.
  
28 A further 3% of respondents stated that the purpose of using 
encryption was to avoid notification following a breach. As regards the use of encryption to 
address data privacy compliance, 79% of respondents used encryption to comply with the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). Thus, the uptake of encryption technologies to mitigate data 
breaches is much less prominent in Australia than the US which is perhaps not surprising 
given that Australia does not have a data breach notification law whereas a majority of US 
states do.29
The results of the Ponemon surveys do have to be treated with a degree of caution given the 
low response rates, which may give rise to non-response biases and may therefore affect 
extrapolated results.
  
30 Winn has also suggested that the uptake of encryption technologies 
for the purpose of data breach notification is not as great as suggested above which either 
indicates that encryption safe harbours have provided weak incentives or the cost of 
implementation is perceived to be greater that the risks arising from not encrypting data.31
3  ENCRYPTION SAFE HARBOURS 
 
                                                     
27 Ibid.  
As a framework for our analysis, we have adopted Jones’s classification of encryption safe 
harbours and notification triggers. In his review of 2007 developments, Jones contends that 
28 Ponemon Institute, 'Encryption Trends - Australia' (2009), 8. 
29 However, see also Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 'Portable Storage Devices and Australian 
Government Agencies Personal Information Survey' (2009), 22 which also suggests that there has 
been a degree of uptake amongst Australian Government agencies regarding protections for portable 
storage devices. 
30 For example in, 2009 997 usable responses out of 14,893 surveys (6.7%); 2008 975 usable responses 
out of 13,448 (7.3%).  
31 J Winn, 'Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?' (2009)  Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal, Vol. 24, 2009, 25. It should be noted however that Winn’s article is concerned with the effects 
of the Californian data breach notification law. 
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two important issues faced data breach notification legislators: the type of notification 
trigger and the type of encryption safe harbour to be adopted.32  
Two types of notification trigger were adduced: acquisition-based and risk-based triggers 
that represent differing approaches to notification. Acquisition based triggers require 
notification in situations where there has been an actual breach or there is a reasonable belief 
of an unauthorised acquisition of personal data. Accordingly, notification may be required 
even when there is no actual evidence of data having been acquired.33 Jones contends that 
data breach notification laws based on an acquisition trigger are more consumer oriented 
because broad notification means that consumers are made aware of potential data breaches 
and can therefore take action to mitigate potential harms before they arise.34 However, 
problems can arise from the use of an acquisition trigger in the form of notification fatigue 
and because of the underlying reliance upon the causal link between data breaches and 
identity theft concerns.35  
Risk-based triggers, on the other hand, set a different standard as these triggers only require 
notification in situations where a risk assessment determines that a sufficient risk of harm 
exists to consumers. Jones further contends that risk-based triggers are business oriented 
because they generally require the corporate entity to make a determination whether a risk 
of harm will or is reasonably likely to arise.36 Moreover, it should also be noted that different 
standards exist as to what triggers notification under a risk-based assessment. For example, 
some laws require a reasonable likelihood that harm may arise37
                                                     
32 M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555, 573. 
 where others require a 
33 Ibid., 562. 
34 Ibid., 563. See also P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 
105(5) Michigan Law Review 913 regarding the role and purpose of ‘pure notification’ data breach laws 
predicated on an acquisition trigger. 
35 This causal link has been a controversial element of data breach notification laws. For a summary of 
the issue see F H Cate, Information Security Breaches: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead (2008) 
<http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/Information_Security_Breache
s_Cate.pdf> at 19 March 2010 and M Burdon, B Lane and P Von Nessen, 'The Mandatory Notification 
of Data Breaches: Issues Arising for Australian and EU Legal Developments' (2010) 26(2) Computer 
Law & Security Review 115, 126. 
36 M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555 563. 
37 See e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); 
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005). 
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significant or a material real risk of identity theft38 or a reasonable likelihood of substantial 
economic loss.39
Our research indicates that a small number of US federal bills and the European Union’s 
(EU) updated e-Privacy Directive
 Some risk-based triggers therefore operate on higher standards for 
notification than others. 
40 also have a trigger that incorporates both elements of an 
acquisition and risk-based trigger but operate in a broader two-tier regulatory manner.41 For 
example, the bill, the Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005 required entities to notify the 
Federal Trade Commission, or other appropriate regulator, of a data breach affecting the 
sensitive personal information of 1,000 or more individuals.42 Notification at this level is 
therefore based on a restricted acquisition trigger of a certain number of persons who may 
be affected. Consumer notification was also required for data breaches that cover one or 
more persons and where there was a basis for concluding that a reasonable risk of identity 
theft existed.43 This two-tier form of notification therefore attempts to ensure that regulators 
are notified of large data breaches promptly upon unauthorised acquisition and consumers 
are notified only if a risk-based assessment determines a risk.44
                                                     
38 See e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS 93H §1 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 
2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 
895.507 (2006). 
 Finally, the new Article 4(3) 
of the e-Privacy Directive requires notification of a personal data breach to national 
authorities based on an acquisition trigger and to subscribers and individuals on a risk-
39 See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007).  
40 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
41 See also P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) Michigan 
Law Review 913, 933 regarding the two-tier approach of the Interagency Guidelines. These are 
guidelines developed by a collection of agencies involved in financial regulation that inform financial 
institutions about how and when to notify a breach. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et 
al, 'Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information 
and Customer Notice' (2005). 
42 S3(a)(1) Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005) . 
43 S3(a)(2) Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005). 
44 However, it should be noted that the consumer notification provisions were removed in the version 
of the bill reported to the Senate and regulatory notification was also changed to a risk-based trigger 
that was subsequently adopted by other bills. 
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based trigger in situations where the breach is likely to adversely affect their personal data 
or privacy.45 
Jones also adduced three types of encryption safe harbour based on an analysis of 10 US 
federal bills that were introduced in the 110th US Congress. The first type, exemptions, 
provide a general safe harbour meaning notification is not required if personal data has been 
acquired in encrypted form. For example, the definition of personal information in 
Californian Civil Code §.1789.29(a), the first and most influential US state-based data breach 
notification law, states that notification is required if a Californian organisation has suffered 
or believes it has suffered an unauthorised acquisition of unencrypted and computerised 
personal information.46 The Californian law does not define encryption.47 Further guidance 
has been produced by the Californian Office of Privacy Protection which provides 
additional information as to what would constitute acceptable encryption in conjunction 
with other information security practices. It recommends that the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Advanced Encryption Standard should be used as the 
encryption algorithm.48 However, the guidance is clear that the “recommendations are not 
regulations and are not binding” so the extent they are adhered to in practice either in 
California or indeed in states that have adopted the Californian law is open to question.49
Our research also indicates that 
  
all US state-based encryption safe harbours can be classified 
as exemptions.50 However, 
                                                     
45 See M Burdon, B Lane and P Von Nessen, 'The Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches: Issues 
Arising for Australian and EU Legal Developments' (2010) 26(2) Computer Law & Security Review 115, 
127 and complications related to notification under the amended e-Privacy Directive. 
there are significant differences between state-based laws 
regarding the construction of encryption exemptions that can be broadly categorised in two 
46 See CAL. CIV. CODE (West 2003)§.1798.29(e) “For purposes of this section, personal information 
means an individual's first name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of 
the following data elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted”. 
47 T H Skinner, 'California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach 
Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation' (2003) 10(1) 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology   
48 California Office of Privacy Protection, 'Recommended Practices on Notice of Security Breach 
Involving Personal Information' (California Office of Privacy Protection, 2008), 10.  
49 Ibid., 8. See also at page 6, “The recommendations offered here are neither regulations, nor 
mandates, nor legal opinions. Rather, they are a contribution to the development of “best practices” 
for businesses and other organizations to follow in managing personal information in ways that 
promote and protect individual privacy interests.” 
50 Only one state, Wyoming, has a data breach notification law with no encryption exemption. 
Instead, it has a redaction only exemption. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 (Michie 2007). The 
District of Columbia also has an exemption to notification that has no reference to encryption. The 
law’s notification trigger states that if personal data has been rendered secure so that it is unusable by 
an unauthorized third party, then notification is not required. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3851 (2007). 
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ways: (1) non-explicit exemptions, such as the Californian law, which do not attempt to 
define encryption51 and (2) explicit exemptions, such as the North Carolina52 and Ohio53 laws 
that do attempt to define encryption.54 A majority of US states have adopted legislation 
based on the Californian law and some have directly copied California’s notification trigger 
and its definition of personal information.55 However, other states have included additional 
provisions in their definition of personal information that specify situations in which 
unencrypted personal information could still be exempt from notification because the 
information is unintelligible.56 A majority of states with explicit exemptions are based on 
two statutory elements that set different standards for indicating when data will be 
considered encrypted. They are through the use of an algorithmic process to transform data 
into a form in which: (1) data is rendered unreadable or unusable57
                                                     
51 See also ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); 
CAL. CIV. CODE (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b 
(2006); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 12B-101 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-
1-911 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 28-51-104 (Michie 2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 (2005); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-
1704 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2006); N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 
(2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Law Co-op 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2101 (2005); TEX. 
BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 48.001 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 19.255.010 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006).  
 and (2) there is a low 
52 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005). 
53 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005). 
54 See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT §§ 487N-1 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 24-
4.9-3-1 (2006); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. 
§§ 14-3501 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 
(2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
186.6 (Michie 2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2A-101 (2008). 
55 See e.g. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 12B-101 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 28-
51-104 (Michie 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010 (2006); 
OKLA. STAT. § 74-3113.1 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-
2101 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 48.001 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2005). 
56 Additional provisions include “redaction”, see e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005) or 
data that is protected “by another method to make it unreadable or unusable”, see e.g. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006).  
57 The first state to use this definition of encryption was North Carolina and was subsequently 
adopted by other states. See e.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-
7501 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT §§ 487N-1 (2007); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 
407.1500 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007); 9 VT. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2430 (2007). 
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probability of assigning meaning to the data.58 Furthermore, there are two explicit 
exemptions found in the Massachusetts and Maine laws that have very different definitions 
of encryption to those found in the majority of explicit exemptions.59 
Rebuttable presumptions are safe harbours that create a presumption that no risk exists if 
encrypted data is acquired which can be rebutted if evidence is found to the contrary. Under 
a rebuttable presumption safe harbour, no notification is required unless it can be 
established that harm exists.60 For example, under the US federal bill, the Data 
Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2009, an organisation would be exempt from 
notification if personal information was encrypted and appropriate safeguards were in place 
to protect the encryption key. If an organisation could show that effective encryption had 
been applied to the acquired personal data, then a presumption would be established that 
there was not a significant risk of identity theft arising from the data breach. This explicit 
presumption could be rebutted by showing that the “method of encryption has been or is 
likely to be compromised.”61 Furthermore, the DATA bill extended its rebuttable 
presumption, in line with the other 2009 bills,62 to cover additional methods or technologies, 
other than encryption, “which rendered data in electronic form unreadable or 
indecipherable.”63
                                                     
58 Likewise, the first state to adopt this definition was Ohio which was again followed by other states. 
See e.g. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005). See also IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
445.72 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 
2005); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Michie 2008); W. VA. CODE 
§§ 46A-2A-101 (2008).  
 The presumption again could be rebutted by showing that the method or 
technology was compromised or was likely to be compromised. In December 2009, DATA 
was the first data breach notification bill to be passed by either the House of Representatives 
59 See MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007). The full definition of encryption reads “encryption is the 
transformation of data through the use of a 128-bit or higher algorithmic process into a form in which 
there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key, unless 
further defined by regulation of the department of consumer affairs and business regulation.” and 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 10, §§ 210-B-1346 (West 2007).  “’Encryption’ means the disguising of data 
using generally accepted practices.” 
60 M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555  
61 S. 3(f)(2)(A)&(B) Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009). 
62 See Data Breach Notification Act of 2009, S. 139, 111th Cong. (2009); Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009). 
63 S3(f)(2)(B) Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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or the Senate. It is therefore possible that a federal data breach notification law could be 
enacted in 2010 and the encryption safe harbour will be a rebuttable presumption.64 
Finally, under the third safe harbour, factor-based analysis, encryption is merely a “factor to 
use in determining whether harm will reasonably result from the breach.”65 For example, the 
data breach notification proposal put forward by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) indicates that one of the key considerations as to whether a data breach could give 
rise to “a real risk of serious harm” was whether the specified personal information was 
“encrypted adequately.”66 Likewise, with the new e-Privacy Directive, a public 
telecommunications service provider will not have to provide notification if it can 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of a competent authority that it has implemented appropriate 
technological protection mechanisms. Such mechanisms would be a factor to demonstrate 
that data had been rendered unintelligible and the measures were applied to the personal 
data involved in the breach.67
4 CRITIQUE OF ENCRYPTION SAFE HARBOURS 
   
We now critique encryption safe harbours through a scenario based analysis involving a 
conditional claim for reliance upon an encryption safe harbour. The scenarios outlined 
below are based upon the two most common forms of data breach, namely, loss of storage 
media or a laptop and a hacking incident.68
                                                     
64 It should also be noted that the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. 
(2009) was also recommended by committee for a full senate vote. This bill has an acquisition based 
trigger but with a risk-based exemption that provides similar effect to a risk-based trigger. 
 However, as we outline below, both of these 
types of data breach potentially engender different types of response. 
65 M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555.  
66 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (2008): 
1692. 
67 Art. 4(c) e-Privacy Directive. 
68 See Open Security Foundation, Dataloss Statistics (2009) <http://datalossdb.org/statistics> at 19 
August 2009. The DataLossDB website has chronicled a dramatic increase in the number of data 
breach incidents from the inception of the first data breach notification law. In 2003, 24 incidents were 
notified but 725 incidents were notified in 2008 and 442 in 2009. The most common type of data 
breaches were stolen laptops (20%), computer hacking incidents (16%) and inadvertent publication on 
the Internet (13%). 
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4.1 A CONDITIONAL CLAIM FOR RELIANCE UPON AN ENCRYPTION SAFE 
HARBOUR 
A threshold condition for encryption to be considered a safe harbor against an obligation to 
notify is that the potentially breached personal information69
1. Adequately encrypted in a manner that is likely to be effective. The unauthorised party 
only has access to the ciphertext, with no access to decryption keys or other material 
that may be used to assist in decrypting the ciphertext. The likelihood that an 
unauthorised party can access the plaintext is very low. 
 exists in encrypted form. There 
are three categories of encryption use satisfying this condition that can be distinguished 
based on the varying efficacy of the encryption in preventing unauthorised access to the 
personal information. They are that the potentially breached personal information was: 
2. Encrypted in a manner that may or may not be effective. It is possible that a sufficiently 
skilled and motivated unauthorised party may be able to recover the plaintext from 
the ciphertext. 
3. Encrypted in a manner that may have been bypassed and is therefore ineffective. The 
potentially breached personal information exists in encrypted form but the 
information that was acquired or lost may not have been encrypted. 
 
Category 1 deals with situations where encryption is used according to best practice, as a 
component of a comprehensive information security program. The encryption algorithm, its 
implementation and its mode of use conform to recognised standards. Key management 
practices similarly conform to standards-based recommended practice, ensuring that the 
decryption key(s) are only accessible to authorised users and were therefore not 
compromised.  A simple example of this scenario is the loss of a USB drive containing a file 
encrypted with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm using a 128 bit 
randomly generated key that was not stored in any form on the drive or any other location 
accessible to an unauthorised party.  
Category 2 covers scenarios where an unauthorised party with the necessary skill, resources 
and motivation, may be able to recover the plaintext personal information from ciphertext to 
                                                     
69 For this sub-section, we use the phrase “potentially breached personal information” to represent 
personal information that may or may not have been acquired in a data breach involving encryption 
protections because the data will only be acquired if the encryption can be defeated (e.g. in category 2 
by a sufficiently skilled and motivated party and in category 3 if the encryption used was bypassed).  
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which they have access. The possibility arises because the unauthorised party may be able to 
exploit weaknesses present in the encryption algorithm, its implementation, its mode of use, 
or weaknesses in the management of decryption keys. An example of Category 2 encryption 
use involves personal information transmitted over a wireless network secured with the 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol.70 The WEP encryption protocol is known to be 
insecure71 and tools are freely available to quickly tap into WEP-protected wireless networks 
simply by monitoring and analysing a small amount of the encrypted traffic.72 The attackers 
who perpetrated the much-publicised TJX data breach, which involved the leaking of 94 
million records of personal information, initially gained access to TJX’s internal computer 
networks via a WEP-secured wireless network.73
Laptop computers with encrypted hard disks are another example of category 2 encryption 
use.
   
74  Hard disk encryption systems including Microsoft’s Bitlocker75 and the open source 
Truecrypt76 are susceptible to a range of attacks on the key management system. For 
example, the decryption key can be recovered from system memory if an unauthorised party 
can gain access to a laptop in a running or suspended state.77 Freely available commercial 
tools exist to mount such attacks.78
                                                     
70 WEP is an encryption protocol for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. Wireless networks broadcast 
network traffic on standard frequencies that can be received by an adversary who is within broadcast 
range. The ciphertext of network traffic is therefore assumed to be publicly known.   
  
71 See R Housley and W Arbaugh, 'Security Problems in 802.11-based Networks' (2003) 46(5) 
Communications of the ACM 31. 
72 Tools such as the freely available Aircrack key cracking program can recover WEP encryption keys 
from protected 802.11 wireless signals in a matter of minutes. See Aircrack-Ng, Homepage (2009) 
<http://www.aircrack-ng.org/> at 20 March 2010. 
73 J Pereira, 'Breaking The Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless Door --- In Biggest Known 
Theft, Retailer's Weak Security Lost Millions of Numbers', The Wall Street Journal (New York), 4 May 
2007 2007, A1. 
74 Given that 20% of data loss incidents involve stolen laptop computers, hard drive encryption is an 
increasingly popular strategy to mitigate the risk of personal information loss arising from stolen 
laptop computers. See Open Security Foundation, Dataloss Statistics (2009) 
<http://datalossdb.org/statistics> at 19 August 2009. 
75 See Microsoft, Bitlocker (2009) <http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windows-
7/features/bitlocker.aspx> at 20 March 2010. 
76 See Truecrypt, Homepage (2009) <http://www.truecrypt.org/> at 20 March 2010. 
77 Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. 
J., Appelbaum, J., and Felten, E. W. 2008. Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys. 
In Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium (San Jose, CA, July 28 - August 01, 
2008). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 45-60.  
78 For example, see  Passware Kit Version 9.5 from Passware Inc. as reported in L Seltzer, New 
Passware Can Crack PGP and BitLocker-Protected Systems” (2009) 




The third category of encryption use deals with scenarios where an unauthorised party can 
access plaintext personal information without the need to acquire the decryption key to 
execute the explicit step of decrypting the ciphertext. Network-accessible or online 
applications provide a common example. The decryption key is not required because the 
application provides an automatically decrypting channel to authorised users. In this 
scenario, it is the authentication that is defeated, not the encryption.79
For example, an online medical records system may store personal information and other 
sensitive health data in a database that is encrypted. Access to the system is controlled via 
password authentication and only authorised users are able to access the plaintext records. If 
an unauthorised party is able to discover the username and password of an authorised user, 
they can access the personal information without knowing the decryption key. They merely 
log on to the application and will be treated as an authorised user. As explained in section 2, 
passwords have a host of well-known vulnerabilities: they can be compromised via phishing 
attacks or via key logging malware installed on an authorised user’s computer. They can 
also be guessed by automated password guessing programs. Though the practice violates 
recognised security management standards, usernames and passwords are commonly 
transmitted over internal networks unencrypted and are therefore susceptible to 
compromise via snooping attacks. In the TJX data breach incident, once the attackers had 
gained access to the internal network, they snooped unencrypted usernames and passwords 
submitted by legitimate users as they logged into transaction processing applications.
 The personal 
information exists in encrypted form but the system provides an interface by which 
authenticated and authorised users can access the plaintext.   
80
The third category of encryption use is potentially the least reliable as a basis for claiming a 
safe harbour from the obligation to notify affected individuals in case of a suspected data 
breach. In the case of compromised login credentials, an unauthorised party can access any 
personal information that an authorised user is permitted to access. Encryption provides no 
protection. Moreover, it is not immediately obvious when an authorised user’s credentials 
such as a password have been compromised. Illicit access may occur for months or years 
 
                                                     
79 For a further discussion of weaknesses of authentication methods see: L O'Gorman, 'Comparing 
Passwords, Tokens, and Biometrics for User Authentication' (2003) 91(12) Proceedings of the IEEE 2021. 
80 J Pereira, 'Breaking The Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless Door --- In Biggest Known 
Theft, Retailer's Weak Security Lost Millions of Numbers', The Wall Street Journal (New York), 4 May 
2007 2007, A1. 
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before it is detected.81
The use of encryption certainly does not provide a guarantee of protection. It is therefore 
arguable that a general notification safe harbor that can be claimed simply because these 
fallible methods are in place is misguided. When a breach is suspected, a better approach 
would be to require affected organisations to undertake a competent review to estimate the 
likelihood that personal information has actually been disclosed, irrespective of the 
protective security mechanisms that are in place. The notification obligation should be 
informed by a process of review and we address this important point in our next section.  
 It is therefore dangerous to assert or conclude that personal 
information has not been disclosed, simply because password authentication, encryption or 
other protection measures are in place. It is very difficult for organisations to know what an 
unauthorised party may have done, and what personal information may have been 
accessed, when a hacking incident is suspected, particularly if best-practice logging, audit 
and review procedures are not being followed. 
4.2 A SCENARIO BASED CRITIQUE 
Our three scenarios demonstrate that the effective use of encryption requires a complex 
management process that goes beyond the simple act of encrypting a given set or piece of 
data. We therefore agree that encryption should not be considered as a silver bullet.82
One of the key aims of data breach notification laws is to encourage effective information 
security management practices. Smedinghoff has placed the development of data breach 
notification laws within the wider ambit of a developing legal duty to provide effective 
 
Accordingly, legal exclusions to notification, as exemplified by an encryption safe harbour, 
should only be available to a breached entity following a competent review of the 
circumstances of a breach. This includes a critical analysis of all relevant information 
security protection measures in place, as well as the processes and procedures observed in 
their ongoing management, and not just encryption.  
                                                     
81 For example, in the TJX data breach it is estimated that the unauthorised party had access to 
internal systems for 18 months before the intrusion was detected.  
82 See T H Skinner, 'California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach 
Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation' (2003) 10(1) 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology ; J Winn, 'Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws 
Possible?' (2009)  Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2009, 14. 
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information security measures.83 Laws that seek to develop this legal duty do so from a 
range of perspectives that can focus on the requirements of information protection in 
specific industrial sectors84 or specific types of corporately held information.85 However, 
regardless of their focus all of these laws intend to ensure that corporate entities have 
implemented appropriate information security controls in relation to the sensitive or 
personal information that they hold.86 Concomitant with the development of these laws, 
there has been a regulatory shift from the imposition of generally accepted standards that 
apply to all circumstances87
“[E]ngage in an ongoing and repetitive process that is designed to assess risks, 
identify and implement appropriate security measures responsive to those risks, 
verify that they are effectively implemented, and ensure that they are continually 
updated in response to new developments.”
 to a more sophisticated and nuanced process-based approach 
applied on a case-by-case basis. Corporate entities are therefore required to 
88
This process-based approach therefore requires corporate information security controls and 
associated management practices to be commensurate and responsive to the entity’s own 
fact-specific risk assessments. Accordingly, it is insufficient to simply implement a 
seemingly strong type of security measure, because that measure may not necessarily 
address the particular threats an entity may face. Drawing on the example in our scenario, 
the loss of an encrypted laptop with a small amount of personal information and the 
decryption key may, on its face, be less of a concern than a hacking attack on a database 
holding millions of personal information records. However, if the laptop was lost or stolen 
from a military or intelligence related government agency, and the personal information 
  
                                                     
83 T J Smedinghoff, 'Trends in the Law of Information Security' (2005) 17 Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Journal 1(5). See also J Winn, 'Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?' 
(2009)  Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2009, 4; J Winn, 'Can a Duty of Information Security 
Become Special Protection for Sensitive Data Under US Law?' (2008)  SSRN eLibrary ; A M 
Matwyshyn, Harboring data: Information Security, Law, and the Corporation (2009), 7-13. 
84 See T J Smedinghoff, The State of Information Security Law: A Focus on the Key Legal Trends (2009), 16 
regarding regulation of the health care sector under the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 and financial sector under the Gramm Leach Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999. 
85 Ibid., 10  such as corporate financial data under the Sarbannes Oxley Act of 2002  
86 T J Smedinghoff, 'Trends in the Law of Information Security' (2005) 17 Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Journal 1(5), 1. 
87 For example, see the discussion about reasonable or appropriate security at T J Smedinghoff, The 
State of Information Security Law: A Focus on the Key Legal Trends (2009), 16. 
88 T J Smedinghoff, 'Trends in the Law of Information Security' (2005) 17 Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Journal 1(5), 3. See also T J Smedinghoff, The State of Information Security Law: A Focus 
on the Key Legal Trends (2009), 17. 
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held was classified, then the threats arising are potentially much greater for the individuals 
involved because the breach could possibly lead to a loss of life.89
We contend that the same should apply to the use of encryption as a basis for a safe harbour 
in data breach notification laws. The evolution of encryption safe harbours indicates a 
changing view of the efficacy of encryption in securing data. In the Californian law and its 
direct descendents, encryption equates to security.
 As such, the 
implementation of appropriate security measures must be context specific and must be 
proportionate to the potential risks arising from a data breach involving the protected 
information and the context in which that information is being held, including the nature of 
the entity. 
90 But as we highlighted in Section 2 and 
in our scenarios, there are many ways to use encryption ineffectively. Therefore, an 
encryption safe harbour that implicitly equates the use of encryption with effective 
protection of personal information is arguably based on a false premise because it does not 
accurately reflect the complexities inherent in comprehensive information security 
management of which encryption of personal data is a mere component and not a total 
solution.91
The simple fact that an entity has employed some form of encryption should not be used to 
found a basis for a safe harbour that precludes notification obligations. Instead, the use of 
encryption should be viewed as one component of a broader information security 
management process. In case of a data breach, the disclosure risk needs to be assessed by 
examining the effectiveness of this broader management system since on its own, the use of 
encryption does not indicate the absence of risk. Moreover, the risk assessment process must 
be undertaken for each and every data breach and must examine the facts specific to each 
breach event. We now address these points against each encryption safe harbour to examine 
  
                                                     
89 See e.g. M Isikoff, Missing: A Laptop of DEA Informants (2004) Newsweek 
<http://www.newsweek.com/id/53958> at 17 March 2010 regarding the loss of a laptop containing 
informant details relating to investigations conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration in the 
US. See also BBC News, MoD Inquiry After Laptop Stolen from Headquarters (2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8409363.stm> at 17 March 2010 regarding the theft of a 
laptop from MoD headquarters in the UK and BBC News, Previous Cases of Missing Data (2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8409405.stm> at 17 March 2010 for other instances of 
security failures involving laptops and sensitive UK government information. 
90 See T H Skinner, 'California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach 
Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation' (2003) 10(1) 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  
91 Ibid.  “Encryption, however, is not supposed to be the primary source of security. It is designed to 
supplement an overall risk-based program. It is part of the solution, not the solution”. 
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the extent to which a risk assessment process is required before the safe harbour can be 
relied upon. Our analysis is based on the scenarios outlined above and Figure 1 provides a 
diagrammatical summary of our analysis. 
Figure 1. – Assessment of Encryption Safe Harbours 
 
Exemptions require little or no risk review particularly in the case of the Californian type 
encryption exemptions with their broad-brush exclusion based on “unencrypted personal 
information.” Under the non-explicit exemptions it is possible that all categories of 
encryption use, as outlined in our scenarios, could provide a basis for relying upon the 
exemption safe harbour because the exemptions only require personal information to be 
encrypted. Category 2 and category 3 types of encryption usage could therefore be exempt 
from notification even though they may not provide effective protections.92
                                                     
92 In the case of category 3 type usage, the organisation may simply not be aware that unencrypted 
personal information has leaked to an unauthorised entity due to inadequacies in its intrusion 
detection and security event monitoring practices. Since the personal information exists in encrypted 
form it may misguidedly assume that a notifiable breach cannot occur. 
 Accordingly, the 
broad-ranging and expansive basis of the Californian type exemptions create a potential 
loophole because any type of encryption, including potentially ineffective encryption, will 
be sufficient for a breached entity to claim an exemption from notification. An organisation 
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can simply install a protection measure that includes encryption regardless of its 
effectiveness, to avail itself of the exemption.93
Those laws that have blanket exemptions for encrypted personal information, such as 
Californian Civil Code 1729(a), indicate a tacit acceptance of this underlying assumption 
because they treat encrypted information as information which is secure regardless of the 
circumstances. This explains why data breaches that involve encrypted personal information 
do not need to be notified: there is deemed to be little or no risk of identity fraud arising 
from the unauthorised acquisition of the protected information.  
 This is because the Californian type 
exemptions require little or no process of review before an exemption can be relied upon 
and it is based on a misguided underlying assumption that encryption equates to security. 
In effect, these laws adopt a broad acquisition trigger but also employ an equally broad 
encryption based exemption.  
The weakness of the non-explicit, Californian exemption has been recognised by other state-
based data breach notification laws but attempts to alleviate potential problems have 
focused on one of two remedial fixes, as highlighted above: (1) the inclusion of additional 
terms to the original Californian definition of unencrypted personal information in non-explicit 
exemptions or (2) the construction of explicit definitions of encryption combined with a 
tendency towards a risk-based trigger.94
                                                     
93 See J Winn, 'Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?' (2009)  Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal, Vol. 24, 2009, 14 “companies can enjoy the benefit of the safe harbor by the use of weak 
encryption technologies without adopting a systemic, risk management-based approach to 
information security”. See also C Carlson, Storm Brews Over Encryption Safe Harbor in Data Breach Bills 
(2005) <http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Government-IT/Storm-Brews-Over-Encryption-Safe-Harbor-
in-Data-Breach-Bills/> at 11 January 2010 and the comments by Bruce Schneier. 
 However, both remedial fixes have caused further 
problems. For example, the inclusion of additional terms has resulted in non-explicit 
exemptions that have conflicting elements. Many state-based laws have adopted the 
wording of the Californian law but have also added an additional statutory term relating to 
94 See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT §§ 487N-1 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 24-
4.9-3-1 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 10, §§ 210-B-1346 (West 
2007); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 445.72 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007); N.C. 




redaction.95 A major problem arises from the combination of redaction and encryption in an 
exemption because redaction is given the same weight as encryption when in many cases it 
should not be because it may be trivially reversible. Guidance produced by the US 
Government’s Department of Health and Human Services in relation to security rules for the 
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)96 make it clear that 
redaction should not be considered as secure as encryption and should only be used with 
paper records.97
The explicit encryption exemptions provide a greater degree of process review than their 
Californian type counterparts
 Accordingly, the lower standard that redaction sets nullifies the higher 
standards offered by properly implemented encryption when combined together. 
98 but they are nevertheless still prone to exempt notification 
based on category 2 and category 3 type encryption usage because of the difficulties that 
arise from attempts to explicitly define encryption either through the combination of 
conflicting terms or through internal inconsistencies. As highlighted above, different state-
based laws set higher and lower standards for what constitutes encryption and problems 
emerge with laws that combine both elements. For example, the Indiana law99 uses different 
terms that are based on a combination of both low probability and unreadable or 
unusable.100
                                                     
95 See e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
530/1 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Law Co-op 2009); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 
895.507 (2006). 
 The use of the phrase “low probability” is different from “unreadable or 
unusable” because it is not an absolute (i.e. the data is either readable or usable or it is not). 
The use of low probability therefore connotes that encrypted data is never believed to be 
96 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104-191). 
97 Department of Health and Human Services, '45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 - Breach Notification for 
Unsecured Protected Health Information' (2009), 42742 “Because redaction is not a standardized 
methodology with proven capabilities to destroy or render the underlying information unusable, 
unreadable or indecipherable, we do not believe that redaction is an accepted alternative method to 
secure paper-based protected health information. As such, under the guidance redaction should not 
given the same weight as encryption and other methods of securing technology. Only destruction of 
paper records will suffice as a requirement and redaction is not enough. The note makes clear that 
redaction is only to be used with paper records”.  
98 Such exemptions require a limited process of review based on whether the encryption adopted 
meets a specified definition of encryption, before an exemption can be relied upon. 
99 See e.g. IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006)§9-2-5 “Data are encrypted for purposes of this article if the 
data: (1) have been transformed through the use of an algorithmic process into a form in which there is a 
low probability of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key; or (2) are secured by another 
method that renders the data unreadable or unusable”[emphasis added].  
100 See also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 445.72 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007). 
23 
 
absolutely secure. These laws effectively have two different operational standards with one 
element operating at a higher level than another. 
The two states with unique definitions of encryption, Massachusetts and Maine also 
encounter problems. The definition of encryption employed by Massachusetts is internally 
inconsistent. The use of a statutory term “transformation of data using 128 bits or higher” 
indicates that the transformation must use a key since 128 bits refers to the key length. 
Therefore the subsequent confidential process element is redundant because confidential 
process transformations are not key-based. Furthermore, the Maine law employs a unique 
definition of encryption that is based on “generally accepted practices.” However, the term 
“general accepted practices” is so broad that it does not necessarily equate to effective 
encryption. For example, the implementation of a particular encryption software package 
could be considered as a generally accepted practice if it is widespread even though it may 
not provide an acceptable level of protection in a given circumstance. Indeed, part of the 
motivation for data breach laws has been recognition of the fact that the general standard of 
protection of personal information by both corporate and government entities has been 
inadequate. When improvements in practice are clearly needed, that which is generally 
accepted may not be the best indicator of what is effective and adequate. 
Rebuttable presumptions provide a greater degree of process review than exemptions 
because they are inherently linked to the risk assessment that is required from a risk-based 
notification trigger. For example, the DATA bill has a general exemption to notification if 
there is “no reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct.”101 A 
presumption is created under the bill which states that encrypted data does not give rise to a 
reasonable risk and this presumption is rebuttable by facts that demonstrate encryption has 
or is reasonably likely to be compromised.102
                                                     
101 S3(f)(1)Data Breach Notification Act of 2009, S. 139, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 As such, whether data is or is not encrypted is a 
key element of the risk-based exemption and the extent to which the implemented 
encryption protections are effective has to be reviewed for an entity to rely on the 
presumption that encrypted data is secure. Unlike exemptions, rebuttable presumptions 
require a breached entity to review its encryption processes before it can rely on the 
presumption as a safe harbour to notification.  
102 S3(f)(2)Data Breach Notification Act of 2009, S.139, 111th Cong. (2009).  
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In terms of our scenario, a safe harbour based on a rebuttable presumption would require a 
review of category 2 and category 3 types of encryption use so it therefore has advantages 
over the use of an exemption and it is less likely to create the potential for the same wide-
ranging loophole because it introduces the notion of effectiveness rather than treating 
technology as infallible. However, several concerns arise from the use of rebuttable 
presumptions as a basis for a safe harbour. The strongest concern is that the onus to rebut 
the presumption is left with the breached organisation itself or by other forms of regulation 
developed by key regulators.103 Leaving the rebuttable process to the breached entity is 
problematic because the historical development of data breach notification laws has 
recognised the reluctance of corporate entities to notify individuals, regulators or law 
enforcement agencies about a data breach, predominantly due to fears of an adverse effect 
on reputation and share price.104
Strictly defined regulatory rules may also be problematic as they have the potential to suffer 
from the same predicaments as encryption defined exemptions and technical advancements 
 Even though the reporting of data breaches is now much 
more common the embarrassment factor is still likely to be a prominent concern of corporate 
entities. Accordingly, the extent to which a breached entity will undertake a review to seek 
facts that rebut an encryption-based presumption is questionable. The uncertainty and 
technical complexity of intrusion detection and forensic analysis in determining what an 
hacker has actually done, and which records have been accessed, particularly in the case of 
category 3 encryption use mean that organisations may chose to hide behind a veil of 
plausible deniability. Indeed, an unfortunate side effect of risk-based notification safe 
harbours may be that some organisations chose to expend less effort in trying to detect 
category 3 compromises since detection may lead to an obligation to notify.  
                                                     
103 For example, S3(f)(2) requires, within 270 days of enactment of DATA that the Federal Trade 
Commission “identify any additional security methodology or technology, other than encryption, 
which renders data in electronic form unreadable or indecipherable, that shall, if applied to such data, 
establish a presumption that no reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct 
exists following a breach of security of such data”. 
104 See e.g. Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Computer Crime and 




that outpace the use of specific types or generations of technologies.105
The potential weaknesses of exemptions and rebuttable presumptions are less likely to arise 
in the use of a factor-based analysis as a basis for an encryption safe harbour because the 
onus for claiming reliance on the safe harbour is squarely on the shoulders of the breached 
entity. In effect, the breached entity has to establish that the encryption adopted was 
effective before it can rely on a safe harbour that exempts notification. The entity is also 
required to undertake a competent review for each and every data breach as the claiming of 
the safe harbour occurs on a case-by-case basis. A factor-based analysis therefore has an 
inherently critical perspective concerning the role of encryption in securing personal 
information and the role of the breached entity in reviewing a data breach.  
 Whilst rebuttable 
presumptions offer a level of review that is higher than exemptions they are still 
questionable as a basis for an encryption safe harbour. They would not automatically 
exempt category 2 and category 3 type uses of encryption, as exemptions could do, but they 
potentially place too much faith in a breached entity’s ability and willingness to competently 
review the effectiveness of encryption processes in case of a data breach.  
In adopting factor-based analysis, the e-Privacy Directive and the ALRC proposal reject the 
notion that encryption automatically equates to security. They have attempted to develop 
less prescriptive definitions that focus instead on risk-based assessments with reference to 
effective industry practices or recognised security management standards. As such, they 
take a broader, context-dependent notion of what constitutes effective security that goes 
beyond the technical process of encryption. They place a greater obligation on data 
collecting entities regarding the development and implementation of adequate security 
measures. However, the fundamental difference between factor-based analysis and the other 
safe harbours resides in the fact that it is the breached entity which must be able to 
demonstrate that the encryption or other methods relied upon were effective because they 
met industry standards of accepted best practice. 
                                                     
105 See e.g. S A Needles, 'The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based Approach to Data Breach 
Notification Law' (2009) 88 North Carolina Law Review 267, 308; K E Picanso, 'Protecting Information 
Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification Law' (2006) 75(1) Fordham Law Review 355, 378 
and Samuelson Law Technology & Public Policy Clinic, Security Breach Notification Laws: Views from 
Chief Security Officers (2007) 
<http://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu/samuelsonclinic/files/cso_study.pdf> at 21 March 2010, 32 
commenting “However, because encryption is an evolving technology, it seems better suited for 
definition and reevaluation by regulatory agencies than strict definitions in statutes.”  
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Returning to our scenario, it cannot be assumed that a category 2 or category 3 type use of 
encryption would give rise to reliance on a safe harbour because the breached entity would 
be required to show that the encryption used in both cases was effective. A factor-based 
analysis will not preclude all types of category 2 and category 3 encryption use from a safe 
harbour but the rigorous review that it requires is likely to minimise the opportunities for 
reliance upon these types of encryption use where, in the specific circumstances, the 
information disclosure risk remains high. Furthermore, a factor-based analysis could 
provide regulators with a much greater understanding of how data breach problems 
develop and we address this point in the final section of our article. 
5 ENCRYPTION SAFE HARBOUR AND TRIGGER RECOMMENDATIONS  
We now put forward our recommendations for the use of our favoured encryption safe 
harbour in conjunction with a notification trigger. 
5.1 FACTOR-BASED SAFE HARBOURS 
We consider that factor-based analysis should found the basis for an encryption safe harbour 
in data breach notification laws. The reasons for our recommendation are outlined above but 
they can be summarised as the combined benefits of having a more realistic perspective on 
the fallibility of encryption that places the onus on a breached entity to prove that the 
protection measures adopted were effective which requires a competent risk-based review 
of each and every data breach. We favour a combined approach that adopts elements from 
the ALRC’s proposal and the e-Privacy Directive.  
The ALRC’s proposed factor-based analysis is advantageous because it has the benefit of 
simplicity and flexibility. The safe harbour includes an integral component of risk-based 
assessment and therefore inherits the compliance reduction aims that are inherent to all data 
breach notification laws. The ALRC have unequivocally attempted to avoid defining 
encryption in any detail. Instead, there is a simple requirement that the type of encryption 
used should be “adequate.” The ALRC’s encryption safe harbour philosophy is similar in 
construction to Californian type exemptions. There is however, a significant departure from 
the use of exemptions as the ALRC’s factor-based safe harbour provides a greater 
conceptual depth as to what constitutes effective encryption, even though it is achieved by a 
simple statutory term.  
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The use of “adequate” connotes that encryption is not meant to be defined as a simple one-
off technical act, as suggested by exemptions. Instead, the ALRC recognize that effective 
encryption should be viewed as existing within a broader security management process that 
entails many different facets and requirements, beyond the mere encryption of data. This 
would require a deeper analysis of category 2 and 3 type encryption uses that the other safe 
harbours may not demand. Encryption will therefore not be adequate if there is an “easy 
means of decoding” data. Such a means may be avoided by the effective protection of 
encryption keys.106 Moreover, because the assessment of adequacy is based on the factors of 
each individual data breach107
Furthermore, by not specifying what encryption or adequate encryption is, the ALRC have 
avoided many of the definitional problems of US state-based exemptions. The simplicity of 
the ALRC’s approach avoids such problems, but at the same time, captures the complexity 
of effective information security management. The use of guidance to define issues of 
adequacy in relation to encryption is also welcomed because it ensures a flexible approach 
that can adapt over time and thus avoid some of the difficulties that can arise when a 
specific form of encryption becomes unsecure, unlike regulatory rules relating to rebuttable 
presumptions. The ALRC’s proposed encryption exemption succinctly balances the need for 
organisations to have a practical and workable definition of encryption with the pragmatic 
reality that effective encryption is more than a single, technical act of encrypting data, thus 
enhancing consumer protections.  
 the ALRC proposal requires the type of risk process review 
envisaged by Smedinghoff that ties the operation of the safe harbour to the factual 
circumstances of each individual data breach. Accordingly, there is a rejection of the 
underlying assumption prevailing in exemptions that encrypted information is secure 
regardless of the circumstances of the data breach. In fact, the opposite is the case. The 
ALRC’s factor-based safe harbour can only be claimed if an organisation can show that the 
encryption adopted was adequate and was likely to remain effective in light of the specific 
particulars of an individual breach.  
However, as we highlight above in our scenario analysis, the effective protection of personal 
information goes beyond the process of encryption and must be based on the concept of an 
ongoing process of risk-based review. The ALRC’s proposal fulfils the latter but less so the 
                                                     
106 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice 
(2008), 1692. 
107 Ibid. These include the type of personal information breached, the nature of the agency or 
organisation that encountered the breach, and the risk of harm that would be caused by the breach. 
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former. As such, the use of a wider factor-based analysis, such as the e-Privacy Directive’s 
focus on “technological protection measures” is recommended.108 Nonetheless, we prefer the 
use of the ARLC’s designated standard of “adequate” over the e-Privacy Directive’s 
“appropriate” because an information protection mechanism can still be appropriate but 
inadequate such as the category 2 and category 3 types of encryption used in our scenario.109
5.2 TWO-TIER NOTIFICATION TRIGGER 
 
Furthermore, we contend that the use of adequate does not entail any further definitional 
requirements for a safe harbour, such as, the condition to render data unintelligible to an 
unauthorised person as stated in the e-Privacy Directive. If a technological protection 
mechanism is adequate it should render data unintelligible and given the morass of 
definitions found in US state-based exemptions, we contend that simple and less is the 
appropriate statutory basis for the construction of a safe harbour.  
We further recommend that a two-tier notification trigger should be used in conjunction 
with a factor-based safe harbour. We generally agree with Jones’s broad assessment that an 
acquisition-based trigger has a consumer protection orientation and a risk-based trigger 
favours corporate compliance reduction.110
                                                     
108 See Art 4 of the e-Privacy Directive “Notification of a personal data breach to a subscriber or 
individual concerned shall not be required if the provider has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
competent authority that it has implemented appropriate technological protection measures, and that 
those measures were applied to the data concerned by the security breach. Such technological 
protection measures shall render the data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access 
it”. 
 However, we contend that the sole use of either 
one of these triggers displaces the complex balancing act that data breach notification laws 
attempt to reconcile. An acquisition-based trigger is too broad and laws that use this trigger 
have developed equally broad exemptions, such as encryption exemptions or restrictive 
definitions of personal information and data breaches to counteract fears of over-
notification. Moreover, the claim that an acquisition-based trigger supports consumer 
protection is weakened by the fact that data breach notification laws, by their nature, focus 
109 For example, appropriate is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “specially fitted or 
suitable” and appropriate technology can mean “technology considered suitable for a particular 
application”. Whereas adequate is defined as “commensurate in fitness; equal or amounting to what 
is required; fully sufficient, suitable, or fitting.”As such, encryption can be suitable for the purpose of 
protecting personal information, but as we have shown with our category 2 and category 3 scenarios 
of encryption use, just because it is considered suitable for a particular purpose it should not 
presuppose that the use of encryption is commensurate in fitness or fully sufficient to fulfil that 
purpose. 
110 M E Jones, 'Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors' (2007) 3 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555, 580. 
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on notification and pay little heed to the consequences of post-notification for individuals.111
We contend that a balance can be achieved through the adoption of a two-tier notification 
trigger. An acquisition-based trigger, based on unauthorised acquisition, would be adopted 
for notifications to a designated regulatory authority and this would ensure that a greater 
understanding of the situation “on the ground” was gained from a regulatory perspective. 
This is an important point as the lack of valid and reliable statistical information has been a 
problem in the development of data breach notification laws.
 
Broad-based notification only provides an effective consumer protection benefit if individual 
consumers have the skills and knowledge to respond effectively to a notification. This 
connotes a degree of consumer education that is missing in data breach notification laws. On 
the other hand, a risk-based trigger, particularly without any regulatory oversight 
provisions, displaces the balance too much towards corporate compliance especially given 
the motivations and incentives to not report a data breach either directly or by conducting 
an inadequate review of information security practices. 
112
Wider notifications to individuals possibly affected and to other relevant authorities could 
then be based on a risk-based trigger formulated on a reasonable risk of harm. We have 
chosen a lower standard for this trigger than some data breach notification laws. Our basis 
for this standard is straightforward – if a reasonable risk has been identified then an 
individual or another authority should be notified. The identification of a risk is therefore 
the important requirement for breached entities. The notified individual should then be left 
to determine whether the risk is sufficient to warrant mitigation based on their own 
circumstances and the information presented to them in the notification. Harm should also 
be construed broadly to consider detrimental impacts such as whether a data breach 
adversely affects the privacy of an individual
 Regulators would therefore 
receive a greater number of notifications but this information would greatly assist with the 
identification of regulatory problems especially at the onset of implementation.  
113
                                                     
111 See P M Schwartz and E J Janger, 'Notification of Data Security Breaches' (2007) 105(5) Michigan 
Law Review 913, 940 and B Lane et al, 'Stakeholder Perspectives Regarding the Mandatory Notification 
of Australian Data Breaches' (2010) forthcoming Media and Arts Law Review . 
 and thus go beyond the mitigation of 
identity theft. In keeping with the process of review outlined in the previous section, a 
breached entity must determine whether a risk exists but notifications should be conducted 
112 See e.g. M Burdon, B Lane and P von Nessen, 'The Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches: Issues 
Arising for Australian and EU Legal Developments' (2010) 26(2) Computer Law & Security Review 
115, 123-4. 
113 See Art 4 of the e-Privacy Directive. 
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in conjunction with the designated regulatory authority. Moreover, a regulatory authority 
should have powers of regulatory oversight and be able to compel notification if a 
reasonable belief of harm has been identified but not acknowledged by the breached entity.  
One of the significant advantages of this format is that it should lead to the development of a 
regulatory jurisprudential discourse about what constitutes the key elements of data breach 
notification requirements, such as an unauthorised acquisition, a reasonable risk of harm or 
adequate technological protection mechanisms, which has been sorely lacking thus far. The 
format will mean however a greater regulatory role than most data breach notification laws 
envisage. We believe this is justified by a wider overall regulatory aim for data breach 
notification that focuses on the development of legal standards for information security. 
Data breach notification is therefore a component in a spectrum of protections that cross 
existing disciplinary boundaries relating to the laws of privacy, information management 
and corporate governance. It is not an end in itself. Rather, it highlights the failings of 
current legal approaches relating to the corporate protection of sensitive information and the 
detrimental impacts that arise from those failings. Whilst data breach notification laws 
provide a lens through which to view those failings they may not provide the requisite 
remedies to resolve them because of their limited focus and their conflicting conceptual 
basis. Laws are required that focus specifically on the development of legal principles 
related to corporate information security management. These laws could play an essential 
regulatory role regarding the protection of personal information and the protection of 
critical information infrastructures that hold our personal information and are now such an 
integral part of our information-based societies. Data breach notification laws provide us 
with a glimpse of this bigger-picture requirement but they do not give us the means to 
construct the regulatory structures to fulfil that requirement.  
6 CONCLUSION 
We have demonstrated that different safe harbours provide a different degree of risk-based 
review in order to claim the benefits of a safe harbour. Exemptions provide little or no 
review before a safe harbour can be relied upon because this safe harbour assumes that 
encryption equates to security. Rebuttable presumptions provide a greater level of review 
before a safe harbour can be relied upon but that review is construed in favour of the 
breached entity. Factor-based analysis requires a competent review and embodies a critical 
perspective concerning the role of encryption and the role of a breached entity in reviewing 
31 
 
and reporting. We therefore recommend the use of factor-based analysis over exemptions 
and rebuttable presumptions as a basis for a safe harbour to notification because of this 
critical perspective and the related requirement for a rigorous review to be undertaken 
before the safe harbour can be relied upon. Our recommended safe harbour is based on a 
combination of the ALRC’s proposal and the e-Privacy Directive. In conjunction with a 
factor-based safe harbour, we further recommend the use of a two-tier notification trigger 
involving notification to regulators on an acquisition-based trigger and notification to 
individuals on a risk-based trigger based on a reasonable risk of harm.  
Critics of our choice of encryption safe harbour and notification trigger may contend that the 
combination of a factor-based safe harbour and a two-tier trigger may be difficult for the 
courts to enforce given its contextual requirement. In turn, this is likely to increase 
compliance costs for organisations regarding notification of data breaches. That may be so 
but we argue there needs to be a general recognition that the issues covered in our article are 
sufficiently important to require ongoing revision of the framework of protection of personal 
information by corporate and government entities. The more we transport our lives to 
information infrastructures, the greater the requirement is to ensure the implementation of 
adequate security measures, commensurate with the type of information being held and the 
nature of the organisation that is holding it. These are complex issues that cannot be 
resolved by the instigation of a particular type of legal obligation, such as mandatory 
notification or a specific technological protection measure, such as encryption. Instead, legal 
and regulatory frameworks must match the complexities inherent in the reality of the 
information society by developing and employing conceptually rigorous, flexible and 
adequate controls.  
Our research into encryption safe harbours re-emphasises the limits of data breach 
notification law. The instigation of legal standards relating to corporate information security 
requires the development of new laws with a clearer conceptual basis and which provide the 
legislative means to develop effective controls and remedies. Data breach notification laws 
certainly assist with the direction of future discourse but they are by no means the end of the 
conversation.  
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